

**Popova V. S. The dispute about logic in the Saint Petersburg university philosophy of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Kaliningrad : Immanuel Kant Russian State University Press, 2010. 161 pp.**

One can possibly say that a foundation for historical-logical research in Kaliningrad was laid by V.N. Bryushinkin's article "Kant's paradigms: The logical form"<sup>1</sup>, which was published in 1985 in *Kantovskij Sbornik*; the article develops an original concept of the emptiness of logical forms in Kant's logic. Later, Bryushinkin addressed Kant's logic on more than one occasion. A series of remarkable publications on the topic – the last of which was published in our journal in 2011<sup>2</sup> – could comprise an extraordinary book. It gave rise to a new research area – logical Kant studies, which became the focal point of four research workshops held in Kaliningrad in 1987–1997. However, it is not only Kant's logic that the works of Prof. Bryushinkin were dedicated to. For example, several of his articles address the issue of applying B.S. Gryaznov's porismatic model of scientific theory development to the methodology of history of logic<sup>3</sup>. This year, the IKBFU Press published his new monograph *Theory of Inference Search: The Origins and Philosophical Applications* written in collaboration with Nina A. Khodikova<sup>4</sup>.

However, as an individual area, logico-historical studies started to develop in 1996, when the Department of Philosophy and Logic was established and young scientists got involved in the research. Several PhD theses were defended at the department under Prof. Bryushinkin's supervision.

To our deep regret, Vladimir N. Bryushinkin tragically passed away in 2012. I would like to hope that logico-historical studies will be continued in Kaliningrad by his students, among whom one may mention Varavara S. Popova, whose works focus predominantly on the history of logic in Russia. She is the author of the first monograph dedicated solely to the history of logic in Russia; it was published by our university in 2010 and already became a bibliographical rarity.

Addressing the history of Russian university logic, V.S. Popova focuses on one of its most remarkable moments through reconstructing the dispute over logical issues between A.I. Vvedensky and N.O. Lossky, which took place in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It makes the book extremely relevant, since the

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<sup>1</sup> Popova V. S. Spor o logike v universitetskoj filosofii Sankt-Peterburga nachala XX veka. Kaliningrad, 2010. 161 s. *Brjushinkin V. N. Paradigmy Kanta: logicheskaja forma // Kantovskij sbornik. Kaliningrad, 1985. Vyp. 10. S. 30–40.*

<sup>2</sup> *Brjushinkin V. N. Logika Kanta i metafizika Strosona // Kantovskij sbornik. 2011. № 3 (37). S. 7–17.*

<sup>3</sup> See, for example: *Brjushinkin V. N., Hodikova N. A. Analiticheskaja interpretacija dokazatel'stv v tablicah Beta i model'nyh mnozhestvah Hintikki // Argumentacija i interpretacija. Issledovanija po logike, argumentacii i istorii filosofii : sb. nauch. st. Kaliningrad, 2005. S. 39–46; Brjushinkin V. N., Hodikova N. A. Racional'naja rekonstrukcija proishozhdenija teorii poiska vyvoda iz gil'bertovskoj teorii dokazatel'stv // Modeli ras-suzhdenij – 1: Logika i argumentacija : sb. nauch. st. Kaliningrad, 2007. S. 205–218.*

<sup>4</sup> *Brjushinkin V. N., Hodikova N. A. Teorija poiska vyvoda. Proishozhdenie i filosofskie prilozhenija. Kaliningrad, 2012.*

studies on the history of logic in Russia are extremely rare. Moreover, the book is, to a certain extent, in line with the recent trends in studies into history of logic in view of the fact that, despite a large number of works on the history of Russian philosophy published since the 1990s, it is the history of logic in Russia that has been hardly covered in their framework. As V.S. Popova convincingly shows, without such research, it is impossible to gain an accurate idea of the major philosophical concepts of Russian philosophers. One can assume that the lack of interest in the history of the university philosophical logic of the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is explained by that this logic was considered somewhat of a dead end in the global history of logic. At the same time, the studies carried out in the field can cast light – which is demonstrated in the book under review – on the major elements of certain philosophical teachings, show the interconnection between logical and philosophical theories in terms of concepts and content, as well as, possibly, offer a new interpretation of the development and genesis of modern logic.

The first chapter of the monograph describes and analyses the discussion between A.I. Vvedensky and N.O. Lossky on logical issues; the analysis is carried out in a broad historical-philosophical context: firstly, the author gives a comprehensive review of its prehistory and, secondly, identifies the philosophical bases of the key logical differences between the teacher and the student. The works of these outstanding Russian philosophers were studied in detail by historians of philosophy; however, an analysis of their logical teachings and the discussion between them gives a new perspective on the issue.

The first section gives an overview of history of logic in the Saint Petersburg university philosophy of the late 19<sup>th</sup>/early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries as assessed by modern historians of logic; the second one introduces the reader to the prehistory of the logical discussion between Vvedensky and Lossky. The author comes to a conclusion that, firstly, “the university logic of the late 19<sup>th</sup>/early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries was marked by psychologism since it was taught in close combination with psychology and epistemology”<sup>5</sup>, secondly, “only the works of A.I. Vvedensky and N.O. Lossky clearly formulate the problem of the psychologistic interpretation of logic and consider the relation between logic and psychology, as well as logic and epistemology”<sup>6</sup>, and, finally that “discussion became one of the forms of existence of the Saint Petersburg logic of the late 19<sup>th</sup>/early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries”<sup>7</sup>.

The third section is dedicated to the logical discussion between Vvedensky and Lossky. The author offers a detailed description of its historical stages and almost all points of discussion and analyses its key moments. This section examines the dispute over the problem of psychologism in logic, polemics on Lossky’s original theory of conditional syllogisms, the interpretation of laws of logic, the issue of truth conditions for singular and general propositions, and the issue of interpretation of analytic and synthetic propositions<sup>8</sup>.

Let us focus on the issue of the nature of analytic and synthetic propositions in logic, which was central to the polemics between the two philosophers. “The major difference between the teacher and the student lies in that N.O. Lossky *rejects* analytic propositions and any relevant doctrine *completely*, whereas

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<sup>5</sup> Popova V. S. Spor o logike v universitetskoj filosofii Sankt-Peterburga nachala XX veka. Kaliningrad, 2010. S. 45.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 46.

<sup>8</sup> Popova V. S. Ibid. Sm. tablicu na s. 68–69.

A.I. Vvedensky is convinced in their existence and, as mentioned above, qualifies the key statement of his work as an analytical proposition in the master's debate of Lossky<sup>9</sup>. Lossky believes that, in effect, analytic propositions do not exist and suggest that any references to them be removed from logic and epistemology. He maintains that any logical connections are ontological and, being "a connection between the antecedent and the consequent", are vital. Ontological connections are of fundamentally synthetic nature, thus, in effect, we use only synthetic propositions.

The fourth section focuses on an analysis of one of the key problems of discussion, namely, the doctrine of conditional categorical inferences. The author convincingly shows that the solution to particular logical problems (for instance, the assessment of conditional categorical inferences) is subordinated by Vvedensky and Lossky to their views of general philosophical nature<sup>10</sup>. So, according to Lossky, since there is no plurality of causes, and the connection between the cause and the consequence is unambiguous in both progressive and regressive directions, conditional categorical inferences can be correct in all four schemes<sup>11</sup>.

In my opinion, an equally or maybe even more important advantage of the monograph is that the study is based on a clearly formulated and substantiated methodological concept resting on the notion of the "image of logic". This notion was introduced by I.N. Griftsova by analogy with the notion of "image of science" used in the Russian history and philosophy of science. According to Griftsova, "the image of logic is the perception of the composition of logic and its theoretical and practical role in science and culture by the scientific community"<sup>12</sup>. This concept suggests identifying the matrix of key parameters of the image of logic for certain historical and logical studies. The "image of logic" makes it possible to structure historical-logical material, whereas the transition from one concept to another is determined by a temporal sequence. The studies based on the notion of the image of logic offer new methods of presenting the history of logic: the non-linear<sup>13</sup>, synthetic, and pluralistic ones. In order to identify the author's image of logic in each case, V.S. Popova uses the expanded parameters of assessing the concepts of psychologism and antipsychologism<sup>14</sup> in philosophy of logic, which were proposed by V.N. Bryushinkin. According to V.S. Popova, the "image of logic" also includes "the type of logic; philosophical perspectives; applications of logic; the connection between logic and thinking; the interpretation of logical laws; the degree of awareness of the logical concept and its foundations"<sup>15</sup>.

Of course, the concepts of the "image of logic" and, especially, the "author's image of logic" are open to discussion. However, one cannot but admit that such method facilitates the solution of problems formulated by Dr Popova. Indeed, such traditional notions as paradigm, research programme, school of thought, area of research, and even "logical system" are hardly relevant to the objective

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid. S. 58.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. S. 82.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. S. 76.

<sup>12</sup> Griftsova I. N. Logika kak teoreticheskaja i prakticheskaja disciplina. K voprosu o sootnoshenii formal'noj i neformal'noj logiki. M., 1998. S. 15.

<sup>13</sup> Popova V. S. Ibid. p. 6.

<sup>14</sup> Brjushinkin V. N. Psihologizm na poroge XXI veka // Logicheskoe kantovedenie – 4 : tr. mezhdunar. seminar. Kaliningrad, 1998. S. 84.

<sup>15</sup> Popova V. S. Ibid. S. 106.

set in the book. Can the concretisation of the “image of logic” to the “author’s image of logic” result in that the number of images of logic will equal the number of authors? It seems that it cannot; the second chapter of the monograph convincingly shows that the “recognition of the author’s image of logic makes it possible to identify the difference and similarities between logical and philosophical concepts and raises the question as to their association with a more general image of logic. Such approach gives a comprehensive idea of logic within a philosophical position of a certain author. An approach to a historical-logical study based on the “author’s image of logic” makes it possible... to reflect the continuity of logical knowledge, take into account the specific features of each logical teaching... include concepts that do not make a revolutionary contribution to the development of logic but still have cultural and educational significance to the history of logic”<sup>16</sup>.

Further, in the second chapter of the monograph, the proposed methodology is applied to certain logical teachings, which gives a common principle for their comparison. It may be of special interest to address the logical concepts of J.S. Mill, G. Frege, and E. Husserl in order to identify and compare certain parameters of images of logic when studying concrete logical concepts. The last section contains a conclusion that the differences between Vvedensky and Lossky are explained by the difference in philosophical perspectives underlying their logical teachings.

V.S. Popova’s monograph was published in 2010; however, the research on history of logic by V.N. Bryushinkin and his students has not stood still. The analysis of logical discussions between university philosophers continues, articles supplementing the monograph are published; the methodological framework for the above-mentioned approach to history of logic has been improved and expanded<sup>17</sup>.

Undoubtedly, this work will be of interest not only for those studying history of logic and philosophy, but also Kant scholars, since it examines the logical teachings of the Russian Neo-Kantians, A.I. Vvedensky, and N.O. Lossky, who had a “special attitude” towards Kant’s philosophy.

*A. Pushkarsky*

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid. S. 144.

<sup>17</sup> See: *Popova V. S.* Ritoricheskij analiz teksta v issledovanijah obraza logiki // Racio.ru : [electronic scientific journal]. 2010. № 3. S. 124–138; *Pushkarskij A. G.* Metodologija istorii logiki: sinteticheskij podhod // Vestnik Baltijskogo federal'nogo universiteta im. I. Kanta. 2011. Vyp. 6. S. 25–34; *Brjushinkin V. N.* Porizmaticheskaja model' proishozhdenija nauchnyh teorij i ee primenenie k issledovaniju istorii logiki // Racio.ru : [electronic scientific journal]. 2011. № 6. S. 194–205; *Popova V. S., Pushkarskij A. G.* Dva kritika logiki professora A. I. Vvedenskogo // Racio.ru : [electronic scientific journal]. 2011. № 6. P. 84–104.